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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a question that permeates almost every professional
conversation among lawyers, both practicing and academic alike: how
will a certain case come out? While the answer to that question is
almost always speculative, it cannot be denied that there are certain
constraints under which judges operate and that such constraints may
have some predictive value. In brief, the question dissolves into two
separate issues. First, on what grounds of authority will a case be
decided, and second, how the choice of that authority, and not another,
can be justified. While the weight given to specific legal authority,
such as the Constitution, a statute, or judicial precedent, is different in
common law and civil law legal systems, in either case it is at
intersection of authority and justification where interpretative
concepts such as textualism, originalism, purposivism, 1 or l’économie
générale 2 come into play.
This paper is structured as follows: first, in Section Two, I provide
a short overview of different approaches to interpretation, drawing on
certain differences and similarities between doctrines developed in
both the United States and the European Union (EU). In Section Three,
I briefly look into the formative constitutional interpretation in the EU
and the United States and identify its key elements, such as text and
purpose. In Section Four, I present an outline of instances of
interpretation according to l’économie générale in case law of the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or the Court). In
1. See Lawrence B. Slocum, Originalism, Hermeneutics and the Fixation
Thesis, in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 130, 131 (Brian G. Slocum ed.,
2017) (explaining that the approach to interpretation of a legal text as formulated or
understood by its authors (subjective approach) or by the public (objective
approach), at the time of its original adoption, is sometimes referred to as
originalism. The invention of the term “original understanding” is ascribed to Paul
Brest who defined originalism as an approach “that accords binding authority to the
text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters.”); see also Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204
(1980) (describing that in Europe, a form of originalism is interpretation according
to legislative history or travaux préparatoires, that seeks justification in the meaning
of text as understood by its authors).
2. The expression l’économie générale is a derivative of a more general concept
of économie that can be traced to ancient Greek and Christian tradition. In practice
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the English translation is “general
structure and purpose,” which does not reflect the subtlety of the French expression.
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Section Five, I discuss the meaning and function of l’économie
générale in EU law. Finally, in Section Six, I present a few concluding
remarks suggesting that l’économie générale relies on or, even
constructs, a narrative within which statutory interpretation takes
place and that the very concept of l’économie générale is inherently
non-political.

II. APPROACHES TO INTERPRETATION
Interpretation, both statutory and constitutional, is at the core of
judicial work. It goes without saying that courts, as interpretative
subjects, develop specific approaches that are sometimes referred to
as canons of interpretation. 3 Descriptors of different approaches to
judicial interpretation include concepts such as judicial self-restraint,
judicial activism, textualism, deferentialism, functionalism,
originalism, or teleology (purposivism). 4 In the process of
interpretation, a rule expressed in written form, which is an object of
interpretation, 5 is attributed certain meaning by a judge. The judge can
define that meaning in a number of ways, for example, from how the
text was understood by its authors; how it was understood by the
public at time of its making; how it is understood by the interpreting
subject at time of interpretation; or by “discovering” its “inherent
qualities,” that are believed to be independent from the author, the
interpreter, and the public. 6
All of the above-mentioned ways of interpretation are justificatory
and not constitutive. In other words, an interpretative approach does
3. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 51 (2012); see also William Baude & Stephen E.
Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1099 (2017) (defining
the canons of interpretation as unwritten rules that set interpretive defaults, establish
priority of sources, and provide guidance for judges when they are faced with
uncertainty).
4. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at xii-xvi; Frank H. Easterbrook,
Foreword in ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxi, xxi (2012); Richard H. Fallon Jr., The
Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal
Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1237-40, 1279-95 (2015).
5. It can also be said that the object of interpretation is a legal rule, not text
itself (text being an evidence of a legal rule).
6. Fallon, supra note 4, at 1237-39.
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not decide a case on its own right, but rather justifies the choice of
legal authority and the judicial decision based on it.
Certainly, the meaning of legal authority depends on the choice of
interpretative approach that the interpreting judge makes. This concept
holds true even when it is considered that judges should do no more
than re-state the intentions of long-gone authors and remain faithful to
the original text. 7 Fidelity to text, being la bouche de la loi, requires
volition in the same way that purposivism does. 8
American and European traditions of statutory interpretation appear
to be considerably different, in that the differences go beyond merely
nominal considerations, such as between textual interpretation and
teleological or purposive interpretation. 9 Yet, there is a clarification
to be made. There is a difference between relying on text and legal
concepts on one side, and relying on function and purpose of law, on
the other. While originalism, at least nominally, positions itself in the
textualist camp, 10 there seems to be a lack of clarity as to whether it is
inherently non-purposive. In my opinion, textualism, in its own right,
seems to be neither inimical to functionalism and purposivism, nor
necessarily originalist.
How can textualism be reconciled with functionalism and
7. Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 612, 614 (2006) (suggesting that “even if the meaning of a constitutional
provision was not fully settled at the time of ratification, it could be fixed by
precedent and the originalist today is as bound by that fixed meaning as he would be
by the meaning of constitutional provisions that were unambiguous upon
ratification”).
8. See id. at 640-41 (referencing Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden,
which argues that “tackling an obscure and equivocal document” requires exploring
meaning through the language of the instrument in connection with its purpose).
9. See Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative
Analysis, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 461, 461-63 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, eds., 1991) (explaining that differences arise in
political theory, institutional structure, legal culture, conceptual framework, and
personnel).
10. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Kavanaugh Testimony, Part 1: On Originalism,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 14, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/
09/14/kavanaugh-testimony-part-1-on-originalis (responding to Senator Mike Lee
on textualism vs. originalism: “originalism, as I see it, means, in essence
constitutional textualism, meaning the original public meaning of the constitutional
text”).
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purposivism? While text is always a starting point around which legal
argumentation revolves, nowadays, no one seems to be a pure
textualist any more. As Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner have put it,
“words are given meaning by their context and context includes the
purpose of the text.” 11
More generally, functional or purposive reading of a text may be
directed towards different postulated purposes, past and future alike.
As Steven Pinker has explained, in order to be “teleological”
(purposive) one needs: “a way of sensing the state of itself and its
environment [this is where text is relevant], a representation of a goal
state (what it ‘wants,’ what it’s ‘trying for’), an ability to compute the
difference between the current state [the text] and the goal state [the
outcome of interpretation], and a repertoire of actions that are tagged
with their typical effects.” 12
For example, the word “marriage” may, depending on the desired
goal state of the interpreter be defined as either “heterosexual only” or
as to “include persons of the same sex.” The point is that the former
approach is not less purposive (or teleological) than the latter, as both
follow Pinker’s teleological pattern and seek to achieve a certain goal
state. Possible arguments that there is some inherent or original
meaning of the word are justificatory in nature. If the authors of the
text originally intended to reserve the word “marriage” for persons of
different sex that reading, from a present-day vantage point, is no less
purposive then the one that seeks justification in the principle of nondiscrimination and leads to the opposite result. It is only after one has
chosen an interpretative approach that the word “marriage” acquires
the meaning purported by the interpreting subject.
Since text can have different meanings, depending on what the
interpreting subject wants to achieve, textualism is not prejudicial to
purposivism. On the other hand, conceptualism in the United States is,
as Felix Cohen articulated, a dilemma between “transcendental

11. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 56 (positing that the difference between
a textualist and a purposive interpretation is not that textualists never consider the
purpose, but rather the four limitations that textualists implement).
12. STEVEN PINKER, ENLIGHTENMENT NOW: THE CASE FOR REASON, SCIENCE,
HUMANISM AND PROGRESS 21-22 (2018) (internal notes added by author).
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nonsense” and “functional approach.” 13 The choice is essentially
between indulging to conceptual purity of a rule and interpreting the
rule as to perform certain function or produce certain legal or social
effects; and thus lending itself to a different kind of critique. For
Cohen, jurisprudence is a “special branch of the science of
transcendental nonsense” because “[r]ules of law, which refer to
[these] legal concepts are not descriptions of empirical social facts . . .
but rather theorems in an independent system. It follows that a legal
argument can never be refuted by a moral principle nor yet by any
empirical fact.” 14 Indeed, while functionalism relies on what a rule
does, or is supposed to do, in the real world, conceptualism seeks
justification within a purely normative sphere. 15 Importantly, since
both originalism and purposivism seek to interpret law in order to
bring about some desired social change, the need to make a choice
between the two emerges only once legal conceptualism is abandoned.
Indeed, prevailing conceptual legal thought may be a reason why the
struggle between originalism and purposivism is largely absent in
Europe. 16
Less so in the EU. The CJEU practices the functional approach, and
its functional interpretations sometimes contradict conceptual
interpretations of national court. 17 For example in Höfner, 18 the CJEU
had to decide whether a Member State-operated employment agency
is subject to application of EU competition rules that apply only to
“undertakings.” The CJEU applied a functional approach and decided
that an entity should be defined as an undertaking, regardless of its
formal legal status under national law. 19 The Court defined an
13. See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935) (explaining that the functional approach has
been presented as a substitute for the theological jurisprudence; however, the phrase
“functional approach” has no structured definition).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 809, 821-22.
16. Europe, meaning legal thought and legal practice of European Member
States.
17. See Case C-41/90, Hofner v. Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. I-1979,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=97109&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11565764.
18. See id. ¶ 20.
19. See id. ¶ 34.
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undertaking as “every entity engaged in an economic activity,
regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is
financed.” 20
Using a functional approach is often necessary in order to overcome
differences between national legal concepts and apply EU law
instead. 21 The dilemma here is not only between a broad and a narrow
reading of the term “undertaking,” but rather whether EU competition
rules can operate smoothly if their meaning diverges from one
Member State to another. In other words, the functional approach of
the CJEU performs an integrative function. The problem here
concerns the question of how to justify an interpretative approach
when it comes to the interpretation of ambiguous statutory text. In
Höfner, the CJEU opted for a functional reading of the word
“undertaking,” without explaining the choice, and made no reference
to any specific interpretative cannon. 22 In any case, the functional
approach is dominantly used to define the meaning of EU law in a
broad spectrum, including the concept of the “State” 23 or the concept
of a “court or tribunal.” 24
20. See id. ¶ 21.
21. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 822.
22. See Hofner, 1991 E.C.R. I-1979, ¶ 21 (“[I]n the context of competition law,
first that the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an
economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it
is financed and, secondly, that employment procurement is an economic activity.”).
23. Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas, 1990 E.C.R. I-3313, ¶ 17,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=96665&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11565877
(“Where a person is able to rely on a directive as against the State he may do so
regardless of the capacity in which the latter is acting, whether as employer or as
public authority. In either case it is necessary to prevent the State from taking
advantage of its own failure to comply with community law.”).
24. See Case C-394/11, Belov v. CHEZ Elektro Balgaria AD,
ECLI:EU:C:2013:48, ¶ 38 (Jan. 31, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=133241&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=12658707; Case C-210/06, Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató
bt, 2008 E.C.R. I-9641, ¶ 6, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=67750&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&par
t=1&cid=12658132; Case C-54/96, Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v.
Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH, 1997 E.C.R. I-4961, ¶ 23,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=43728&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11565919 (“In order to determine
whether a body making a reference is a court or tribunal for purposes of Article 177
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In brief, the functional approach responds to the question: What
does a rule do in the real world? Once that question is asked, further
dilemmas emerge, such as: What did the authors of the rule want the
rule to achieve? What did the public think the rule was going to
achieve (general public meaning)? What does the interpretative
subject think the rule was meant to achieve? None of these questions
can be answered by referencing to legal concepts.

III. L’ÉCONOMIE GÉNÉRALE BETWEEN TEXT
AND PURPOSE AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
DIMENSION
The notion and concept of economy, originates from the ancient
Greek notion oikonomia, meaning administration of the house.25
Giorgio Agamben points out that the “techne oikonomike” differs from
politics, just as the house (oikia) differs from the city (polis).26
According to Agamben, “Xenophon defines this activity or ordered
administration as ‘control’ (episkepsis, from which derives episkopos,
‘superintendent,’ and, later, ‘bishop’).” 27 Furthermore, the economy
implies “the ordering of the themes (taxis), a choice (diairesis) and an
analysis (exergasia) of the topics.” 28 Agamben continues, that, “in the
Christian age, the term oikonomia is transposed into a theological
field, in which, according to a widespread belief, it would acquire the
meaning of a ‘divine plan of salvation’ (with particular reference to
Christ’s incarnation).” 29 Existence of divine economy implies the
of the Treaty . . . the Court takes account of a number of factors, such as whether the
body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether its jurisdiction is
compulsory, whether its procedure is inter parties, whether it applies rules of law
and whether it is independent.”).
25. See Dotan Leshem, Retrospectives: What Did the Ancient Greeks Mean by
Oikonomia?, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 225, 225 (2016) (explaining that the term
oikonomia is loosely connected to budgeting, but it is not relevant to contemporary
economics).
26. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY: FOR A THEOLOGICAL
GENEALOGY OF ECONOMY AND GOVERNMENT 17 (Werner Hamacher ed., Lorenzo
Chiesa & Matteo Mandarini trans., 2011).
27. Id. at 18.
28. Id. at 19.
29. Id. at 20-22 (citing 1 Corinthians 9:16–17 (King James)) (suggesting that
“oikonomia is the task (as in Septuagint, Isaiah 22:21) that God has assigned to Paul,
who therefore does not act freely, as he would in a negotiorum gestio but according
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possibility of only one correct interpretation. As Timothy 1:3-4 states,
“[y]ou were to command certain persons to give up teaching erroneous
doctrines and studying those interminable myths and genealogies,
which issue in mere speculation and cannot make known the
oikonomia of God, which works through faith.” 30
In the sphere of law, interpretation according to l’économie
générale relies partly on the place of a rule under interpretation within
a more general regulatory scheme and partly on the purpose that it
allegedly seeks to achieve. 31 In its English iteration l’économie
générale is translated as “general structure and purpose.” 32 This
reliance on the purpose of a rule, as opposed to fidelity to the text,
evokes an uncanny resemblance with the distinction between the
textualist approach and the purposive approach in American legal
interpretation, a resemblance I would like to dispel.
Legitimacy of adjudication is often mentioned as one of the
principal reasons that fidelity to the text should be preferred over
teleology. 33 As a creation of a legislature, text is more readily
understood to impart some historical, allegedly original, stabile, or at
least pre-determined meaning that was, and arguably continues to be,
the will of the legislature. 34 In that view, interpretation that would rely
to a bond of trust (pistis) as apostolos (‘envoy’) and oikonomos (‘nominated
administrator’).”).
30. See id. at 22 (citing 1 Timothy 1:3–4 (King James)).
31. See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=
D8A14A1B37714566F0BBCAC96FF97515?text=&docid=87120&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7532687 (applying the
concept of l’économie générale in considering the spirit, wording, and the general
scheme).
32. Compare id. at 12 (using the term “general scheme” for the English
translation), with Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 22 (Fr.). http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=
&docid=87120&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1
&cid=1546602 (using the French word “l’économie” for the English term “general
scheme” in the French translation).
33. See VALERIE C. BRANNON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION; THEORIES,
TOOLS, AND TRENDS 1, 2, 11 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45153.pdf
(discussing that the legitimacy of the court’s statutory interpretation hinges upon its
fidelity to congressional will and, therefore, textualism supports that legitimacy in
believing that the text provides a clear indication of legislative intent).
34. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, VA. L. REV. 419,
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on contemporary meaning of a rule does not reflect either the original
intent of the authors or its original public meaning. 35 A court opting
for contemporary meaning typically discards the original intention of
the legitimate lawmaker, and becomes a legislator. 36 As Chief Justice
Roberts opined in King, “in every case we must respect the role of the
Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done. A fair reading
of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan.” 37
Interpretation according to l’économie générale approaches the
problem of legitimacy of adjudication in another way. It does not
claim to either establish the original meaning of a rule or to give a
contemporary interpretation, but instead looks into its “intrinsic”
qualities. 38 What l’économie générale pursues is not overturning the
textual meaning of a rule, but discovering its useful meaning by
placing it into a broader framework of reference, by looking at it as a
part of a broader, analytical context. 39
As I would suggest, interpretation according to l’économie générale
is a combination of ontological and teleological interpretation that
seeks to reconcile the text with ontology of the legal system and with
the function that the rule under interpretation performs within it.
Inasmuch it takes the text as a starting point, l’économie générale
seems to be similar, though not identical, to the objectivist stream of
419-20 (2005) (describing the textualists’ approach to prioritize the text over
legislative history, in order to help prevent potential discrepancies that may arise due
to the complexities of the legislative process and inaccuracy of interpreters of
legislative history).
35. See id. at 421 (explaining that leading modern textualists prioritize the true
interpretations behind the text, while classical textualists favor an objective or
reasonable interpretation).
36. See Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939) (discussing the follies
of legislative interpretation and the potential risk of exceeding the role of
interpretation).
37. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
38. See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=
D8A14A1B37714566F0BBCAC96FF97515?text=&docid=87120&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7532687 (applying the
concept of l’économie générale in a consideration of the spirit, general scheme, and
wording in legal interpretation).
39. See id. (finding a legal interpretation in applying the wording of the
provisions amidst the general context and intent).
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the American original intent approach. 40 The main similarity between
the two being that both start from an assumption that a text must have
some fixed and independent meaning. Nevertheless, there are a variety
of options that can be used to understand that fixed meaning, such as: 41
the will of the founding fathers, by determining its objective public
meaning, or by looking into inherent properties of the rule under
interpretation. Both, American original intent and l’économie
générale assume certain inherent qualities of the rule under
interpretation and include a functional and teleological component,
that is the objective that the rule seeks to achieve. Interestingly, this
interpretative approach was present in formative periods of
constitutional interpretation, both in the United States and the EU. 42

A. THE UNITED STATES
The idea that certain constitutional rules have an intrinsic meaning
that is embedded into the constitutional arrangement can be traced
back to Marbury v. Madison, where Chief Justice Marshall construed
the doctrine of judicial review from the nature and structure of the
Constitution. 43 As it follows from Marbury, judicial review is an
inextricable and intrinsic part of constitutional design, attached to the
idea of constitutional supremacy. The province and duty of the
judiciary to engage in judicial review flows naturally from that grand
scheme and does not require reference to specific constitutional text
40. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional
Interpretation, 103 NW. L. REV. 703, 703 (2009) (opining that the American original
intent approach incorporates the goal of finding the objective meaning of the text to
a reasonable person, while the mental state of the drafters is not applicable to the
analysis).
41. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 7, at 613-14 (discussing that the concept where
a meaning is “fixed” post-ratification, as opposed to at ratification, reconciles both
the ability to fix the meaning at a given point of origin and the discrepancies that can
exist in interpretations of framers’ intent at the time of ratification).
42. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (acting as the
fundamental and paramount law of the United States); Van Gend en Loos, 1963
E.C.R. at 12 (discussing the spirit of the law).
43. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (“This theory is essentially attached to a written
constitution, and is consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of the
fundamental principles of our society. . . . It is emphatically the province and duty
of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule.”).
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or other legal authority. 44 Years later in McCulloch v Maryland, Chief
Justice Marshall invoked the nature of the Constitution in the famous
sentence “we must never forget that it is a Constitution we are
expounding.” 45 As in Marbury, the Court in McCulloch suggested that
the Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” 46
This dichotomy between permanence of the constitutional text and the
need for its adjustment to contingent circumstances both necessitates
and justifies the idea of judicial review.
Openness of the constitutional text is not accidental and plays a key
role as part of the grand scheme of the judiciary. Supremacy of the
constitutional text flows not only from its hierarchical position in
respect of ordinary legislation, but also from its inherent idea that
establishes separation of powers and from the accompanying narrative
to which law, legislative and judge-made alike, has to fit. 47 The tension
between the idea of the fixed original meaning and judicial fine-tuning
in constitutional interpretation, is nicely articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall who wrote that the nature of a constitution requires that “only
its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated,
and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced
from the nature of the objects themselves.” 48

44. See id. at 178-79 (opining that the Constitution prescribes authority to the
courts to decide whether a case is in conformity to the law regardless of explicit
reference to judicial review in the constitutional text).
45. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (“Its nature, therefore,
requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects
designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from
the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers
of the American Constitution is not only to be inferred from the nature of the
instrument, but from the language. Why else were some of the limitations found in
the 9th section of the 1st article introduced? It is also in some degree warranted by
their having omitted to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a
fair and just interpretation. In considering this question, then, we must never forget
that it is a Constitution we are expounding.”).
46. See id. at 415.
47. See M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
52, 55 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution upholds the concept of separation of
powers in separating specifically the legislative and executive branches).
48. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
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B. EUROPEAN UNION
Unlike the comprehensive U.S. Constitution, the EU is based on the
Founding Treaties, which fall short of having constitutional character
in its classic understanding. 49 Nevertheless, the Founding Treaties
represent the basic and paramount source of law that is not
infrequently identified with a constitutional charter. 50
The cornerstone of EU law, as we know it today, was laid down in
the landmark Van Gend en Loos case. 51 The case is best known for its
bold introduction of the direct effect of the Founding Treaties and
assertion that EU law directly creates individual rights, which national
courts must protect. 52 It is, however, less remembered that the Court,
immediately after defining the question posed by the Dutch court,
addressed the question concerning the direct effect of, then, Article 12
49. See
EU
Treaties,
EUR.
UNION,
https://europa.eu/europeanunion/law/treaties_en (last visited, Feb. 9, 2019) (explaining that EU law is, instead,
based on treaties that are voluntarily approved by each member country).
50. See generally Opinion 2/13, On Accession of the European Union to the
European Convention on Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
ECLI:EU:C:1990:440, ¶ 163 (Dec. 18, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/show
Pdf.jsf?text=&docid=95839&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=fi
rst&part=1&cid=11567045; Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement Between the
Community, on the One Hand, and the Countries of the European Free Trade
Association, on the Other, Relating to the Creation of the European Economic Area,
2014 E.C.R. I-6079, ¶ 21, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=
97703&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=115
66922; Case C-314/91, Beate Weber v. European Parliament, 1993 E.C.R. I-1093,
¶ 8, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=98243&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11566965; Case C-2/88
Imm., Zwartveld & Others, 1990 E.C.R. I-3365, ¶ 16, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61988CO0002%2802%29; Case 294/83,
Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, ¶ 23,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=92818&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11566569; Opinion 1/76, Draft
Agreement Establishing a European Laying-Up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels,
1977 E.C.R. 741, ¶ 12, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=89181
&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=11566709
(providing sources of law that do not rely upon a core constitutional framework).
51. See generally Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie
der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=
D8A14A1B37714566F0BBCAC96FF97515?text=&docid=87120&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7532687.
52. See id. at 1, 7, 16.
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of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC
Treaty). 53 At the beginning of its discussion of the merits of the case
stated, “it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and
the wording of those provisions.” 54
These elements, the spirit, general scheme (l’économie générale),
and the wording, are explained in the subsequent paragraphs where the
Court explained that the objective of the EEC Treaty is to establish a
common market. This objective is confirmed by the Preamble, which
refers not only to the Member States’ governments but also to the
people and creates common institutions, such as the CJEU, and gives
it the role to interpret the Founding Treaties. 55 Based on these claims,
the CJEU has drawn the conclusion that the Treaties created a “new
legal order of international law for the benefit of which the Member
States have limited their sovereign rights.” 56
The wording of the judgment does not clearly distinguish the spirit
of the Court’s ruling or the EEC Treaty, 57 but rather deals with them
together. While the spirit of the EEC Treaty can be implied from the
Schuman’s Declaration of May 9, 1950, the Court explicitly referred
to the objective of the EEC Treaty, which is the creation of a common
market. 58 At the same time, reference to the common institutions and
the role of the CJEU defines the agents by which this objective will be
achieved. Together, the objective (common market) and the means for
its achievement (common institutions) create the grand plan, laid
down by the Treaties, or in other words, the economy of European
integration. 59
53. See id. (stating the purpose of Article 12 is to ascertain whether the
provisions extend enough to consider the spirit and grand scheme of the wording of
those provisions); see generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community art. 12, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]
(stating that member states shall refrain from introducing any new customs duties,
or increasing any duties, between the commercial relations amongst themselves).
54. Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. (claiming the Treaty is more than just an agreement to create mutual
obligations because it affects member states and their citizens to cooperate in a
community).
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The Court continued to analyze the economy of the EEC Treaty in
the area of customs duties and measures of equivalent effect by
referring, first, to the essential character of the customs union and
emphasizing its prominent place in the part of the EEC Treaty that
defines the fondements de la Communauté. 60 The assertion that Article
12 creates a clear and unconditional prohibition that serves as the basis
for the direct effect of that EEC Treaty provision that is, its
applicability in relations between individuals and the member states,
makes sense only in the light of the aforementioned economy of the
Treaty. 61 In other words, this assertion makes sense only in light of the
grand scheme according to which the customs union, the foundations
of the EU Community and prohibition against introducing new
customs, duties, and measures of equivalent effect, and, finally, the
judicial review by means of a preliminary reference to the CJEU, all
serve to a more prominent, yet unspoken, purpose. The prominent, yet
unspoken, purpose being the process of European integration.
In Van Gend en Loos, l’économie générale was referred to in order
to justify the direct effect of EU law and the new legal order within
which it operates. 62 These features of EU law were not obvious at the
time and the case itself could have had an entirely different outcome.
The Court did not refer to any black letter legal authority, 63 likely
because such legal authority did not exist. In other words, l’économie
générale was invoked in order to justify the distinction between the
existing concept of international law and the “new legal order” that
was introduced by the Court. That justification is ontological, as it
relies on inherent characteristics of the legal order of the EU.
Individual rights based in EU law and judicial protection thereof are,
from the beginning, an inextricable part of the new legal order and the
source of its identity. That is so because of the grand scheme on which
the Founding Treaties are based, namely their spirit and l’économie
60. See id. at 12 (stating that the Treaty defines the “Foundations of the
Community” in Article 12 which bases the Community upon a customs union).
61. See id. at 13 (“The wording of Article 12 contains a clear and unconditional
prohibition which is not a positive but a negative obligation.”).
62. See id. at 12-13 (stating the nature of the Article 12 prohibition makes it ideal
to produce direct effects in the legal relationships between member states).
63. See generally id. at 1 (showing there is no black letter law used within the
opinion).
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générale.
The system of preliminary references enshrined in Article 267 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU Treaty)
is also a part of the same grand scheme. 64 In Simmenthal 2, 65 the Court
linked the l’économie générale of then Article 177 66 to its useful
effect. In paragraph nineteen, the Court pointed out that the power of
a national court to address a preliminary reference to the Court follows
from the l’économie générale of that Article in which the Article
includes a right to refer; once the reference is decided by the CJEU, it
includes the power to set aside any contradicting national legislation.67
In paragraph twenty, the Court continued by observing that any
obstacle to do so would diminish the useful effect of Article 177. 68
Again, it is not about a desired goal or outcome of the Founding
Treaties, but rather about its inherent structure and idea. And once
again, the answer follows from the grand scheme, not from a specific
legal authority. To extent that Simmenthal 2 is an extension of Van
Gend en Loos, both cases make part of the same plan and scheme of
judicial review. 69

64. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 267, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 164.
65. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal
S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629, ¶¶ 19-25, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?
text=&docid=89693&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&par
t=1&cid=11567641.
66. Article 177 is one of the key provisions of the Founding Treaties since the
beginning of the EU. Numeration of articles changed over time and today it is Article
267 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. See EEC Treaty, supra
note 53, art 177.
67. Simmenthal S.p.A., 1978 E.C.R. 629, ¶ 19.
68. Id. ¶ 20.
69. Compare id. ¶¶ 19-20 (“The effectiveness . . . would be impaired if the
national court were prevented from forthwith applying Community law in
accordance with the decision or the case-law of the Court.”), with Case 26/62, Van
Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=D8A14A1B37714566F0BBCA
C96FF97515?text=&docid=87120&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=7532687 (“Independently of the legislation of Member
States, Community law therefore not imposes obligations on individuals but is also
intended to confer them rights which become part of their legal heritage.”).
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IV. L’ÉCONOMIE GÉNÉRALE IN
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CJEU
Incidence of interpretation according to l’économie générale in
practice of the Court is not negligible; five in the first quarter of 2019,
twenty-three in 2018, thirty-four in 2017, thirty-two in 2016, twentysix in 2015, and thirty in 2014. 70 With that relatively high incidence in
mind, my aim is to shed some light on the concept of l’économie
générale, as a means of legal interpretation, and on what the Court
looks into when it refers to l’économie générale of a certain legal rule
or arrangement.
The CJEU does not seem to have developed a coherent approach as
to when and how to apply l’économie générale as an interpretative
tool. As I have shown above, 71 in the formative period of the EU, the
CJEU invoked l’économie générale as a justification of the European
legal order. 72 The CJEU has since referred to l’économie générale in
a variety of situations. The cases referred to below are representative,
yet not exhaustive.

A. FINDING THE MEANING OF LAW
When there are discrepancies between different linguistic versions
of secondary EU law, the meaning of a rule needs to be determined by
reference to l’économie générale. 73 This has become a wellestablished, uncontested, and relatively frequent practice. 74 Again,
l’économie générale is used to discover an inherent meaning of the
70. Figures based on author’s research. See EUR-Lex: Access to European
Union Law, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html (search “l’economie générale”
and limit results to judgments of the CJEU).
71. See supra Section III.B.
72. Id.
73. Case C-$TTB,&F 8%<!)UP@ 8<!7!=;1!)<S 1D ‘I<*SO!3 !9 !<1)75!+!R3 *9@3*!=@7’
VI, ECLI:EU:C:2018:209, ¶ 78 (Mar. 22, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=200548&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12867775.
74. See id. (stating that it is settled case law that when there is a divergence
between language versions of legislative text, the provision must be interpreted by
reference to the purpose of the rules of which it forms part); see also Case C-16/16
P, Kingdom of Belg. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2018:79, ¶ 49, (Feb. 20, 2018),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=199442&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12869309.
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legal rule based on its original intent. Because the meaning is supposed
to be the same in the entire EU, different linguistic versions of a rule
are not more than an imperfect reflection.
In case C-688/15, pronounced on March 22, 2018, the CJEU
decided: “it is settled case-law that, where there is a divergence
between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the
provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose
and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part. 75
In this particular instance the Court takes interpretation en fonction
de l’économie générale seriously. First, it is invoked as authority by
reference to, and citation of, what is considered by the CJEU to be
settled case law. 76 The Court normally employs such references when
it intends to emphasize that its decision is based on solid legal
authority. 77 Second, when it comes to the citation of cases, the word
“inter alia” (“notamment”) implies that the cited cases are only a
selection from a much larger pool and the same can be said in respect
of the reference to “jurisprudence citée,” that is, earlier judgments
referred to in the cited cases. 78
While l’économie générale is used to interpret the meaning of EU
law, the way in which the CJEU does it varies. In case C-58/17, the
Court referred to documents that, although not legally binding,
provide for additional indication that can clarify the l’économie
générale of the directive. 79 In that particular case, the meaning was
determined based on the grounds of the meaning of the directive, as
informed by non-binding documents. 80
75. Agnieška Anisimovienė, ECLI:EU:C:2018:209, ¶ 78.
76. See id. (citing to the judgments of C-604/11, Genil 48 and Comercial
Hostelera de Grandes Vinos, EU:C:2013:344, ¶ 38 (May 30, 2013), and C-48/16,
ERGO Poist’ovna, EU:C:2017:377, ¶ 37 (May 17, 2017)).
77. The argument might otherwise be vague because the meaning of text is not
obvious, and it is not clear why the Court opted for one interpretation and not for
another.
78. Agnieška Anisimovienė, ECLI:EU:C:2018:209, ¶ 78.
79. Case C-58/17, INEOS Köln GmbH v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2018:19, ¶ 41
(Jan. 18, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
198528&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=128
71379.
80. Id. (explaining that “guidance on allocation methodologies” documents
clarify and inform the directive and the decision, even though the documents are not
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However, sometimes the Court restricts itself to simply stating that
l’économie générale determines the meaning of a rule. In the Roquette
Frères case, 81 the Council invoked l’économie générale in order to
argue that the European Parliament does not have a right to intervene
before the Court. 82 The Council argued that because Parliament did
not have standing to sue for annulment of an act, it also did not have a
right to intervene. 83 The Council also argued that Parliament did not
have a legal interest in the outcome of the case and that the Court
should control whether such interest existed. 84
The Court, in paragraph twenty-one, declared the Parliament’s
intervention was admissible, by reference to l’économie générale of
Article 37 of the Statute of the Court that allows persons, other than
Member States and the EU institutions, to intervene provided such
persons have a legal interest. 85 The Court concluded that Article 37
also supported the assertion that institutions, including Parliament, are
not subject to this restriction. 86

B. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF EU LAW
In Slovakia Republic v. Council, the Court invoked l’économie
générale to define the scope and application of paragraphs two and
three of Article 78 of the TFEU Treaty. 87 Those provisions regulate
the common European asylum system and provide, in paragraph two,
legally binding).
81. See Case C-138/79, SA Roquette Frères v. Council Eur. Cmty., 1980 E.C.R.
3333, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=90473&pageIndex=0
&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=12872666.
82. Id. ¶ 17 (explaining that the EEC Treaty does not grant the European
Parliament the authority to intervene in proceedings pending before the Court).
83. Id. ¶ 20.
84. Id.
85. Id. ¶ 21.
86. Id. (“Although the second paragraph of Article 37 of the Statute of the Court
provides that persons other than States and the institutions may intervene in cases
before the Court only if they establish an interest in the result, the right to intervene
which institutions, and thus the Parliament, have under the first paragraph of Article
37 is not subject to that condition.”).
87. Case C-643/15 & C-647/15, Slovak Republic, Hung. v. Council E.U.,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:631, ¶¶ 2-3 (Sept. 6, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=194081&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=11347401.
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that “the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures for a
common European asylum system” and in paragraph three, envisage
emergency situation where one or more Member States are confronted
with a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries. 88 In the latter case,
the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting
the European Parliament, may adopt provisional measures. 89 Such
measures based on Article 78(3) were proposed by the Commission
on September 9, 2015, and after, amendments were adopted. 90 Those
measures were subsequently attacked by Hungary as being adopted on
the wrong legal basis, thus, giving rise to a breach of an essential
procedural requirement, as the European Parliament was allegedly not
properly consulted. 91 In dismissing this argument, the Court invoked
l’économie générale to establish a relationship between paragraphs
two and three of Article 78 of the TFEU. 92 According to the Court,
these two provisions pursue different objectives, notably, to quickly
respond to a crisis (paragraph three) and to regulate common asylum
policy for an indefinite period in a general way (paragraph two).93
Accordingly, a restrictive interpretation, according to which acts
adopted on the legal basis of Article 78(3) can only refer to those
adopted on basis of Article 78(2) and may not derogate from them,
was rejected by the Court. 94

C. FILLING REGULATORY LACUNAE
The CJEU occasionally employs l’économie générale to fill lacunae
in the legal text. For example, in Florea Gusa, the Court invoked the
l’économie générale to determine whether persons who ceased to
work as self-employed persons are within scope of a Directive rule

88. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 78, ¶¶ 2-3, 2016 O.J. C 202.
89. Id. at art. 78, ¶ 3.
90. Slovak Republic, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631, ¶¶ 3, 102 (demonstrating that the
Commission submitted a proposal for establishing provisional measures for the
benefit of Italy, Greece, and Hungary).
91. See generally id. (portraying Hungary’s attack throughout the Judgment).
92. See id. ¶ 72.
93. Id. ¶¶ 2(3), 73.
94. Id. ¶ 334.
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applicable to persons who have ceased to work as employed persons. 95
The Court explained that it follows from l’économie générale of the
Directive that it applies to both categories. 96
Similarly, in Austria Asphalt, the Court was seized to interpret
Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January
2004, on the control of concentrations between undertakings. 97
According to Article 3, a concentration is to be deemed to arise, inter
alia, where a change of control on a lasting basis results from the
acquisition, by one or more undertakings, of direct or indirect control
of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings, 98 but only
where that undertaking performs on a lasting basis on all of the
functions of an autonomous economic entity. 99 The Court observed “it
cannot be determined from the wording of Article 3 of the regulation
alone whether a concentration, within the meaning of that regulation,
is deemed to arise as a result of a transaction by which the sole control
of an existing undertaking becomes joint when the joint venture
resulting from such a transaction does not perform all the functions of
an autonomous economic entity” 100 Accordingly, the answer needs to
be found by reference to l’économie générale. 101

D. INSTRUCTING NATIONAL COURTS HOW TO DECIDE
Interpretation according to l’économie générale is not reserved for
95. See Case C-442/16, Florea Gusa v. Minister of Soc. Prot., Ir.,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:1004, ¶ 38 (Dec. 20, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=198063&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13080658.
96. Id. (explaining that it cannot be inferred from Article 7(3)(b) that (b) covers
only the situation of persons who have ceased to work as employed persons,
excluding those who have ceased to work as self-employed persons, but rather that
this can be concluded when read within the general scheme of Directive 2004/38).
97. Case C-248/16, Austria Asphalt GmbH & Co OG v. Bundeskartellanwalt,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:643, ¶ 1 (Sept. 7, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?
language=en&num=C-248/16.
98. Id. ¶ 5 (referencing Article 3(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No.
139/2004).
99. Id. (referencing Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004).
100. Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added).
101. See id. ¶ 20 (“When a textual interpretation of a provision of EU law does
not permit its precise scope to be assessed, the provision in question must be
interpreted by reference to its purpose and general structure.”).
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the CJEU. Where EU law refers to national law, such as in the case of
Directive 93/13/EEC, 102 the Court can instruct the national court to
examine the matter according to l’économie générale. That was the
case in Andriciuc, 103 where the Court was seized with interpretation
of, inter alia, Article 1(2) of the Directive according to which “[t]he
contractual terms which reflect mandatory statutory or regulatory
provisions and the provisions or principles of international
conventions to which the Member States or the Community are party,
particularly in the transport area” fall outside scope of the Directive.104
According to observations of Rumanian Government, that may have
been the case with a clause of contract in question, that was, allegedly
a reflection of Rumanian civil code. 105 The Court went on to instruct
the national judge to establish whether the contractual rule in question
satisfies criteria that would bring it within the scope of the Directive,
or not. 106 That should have been assessed by taking into account “the
nature, the general scheme and the stipulations of the loan agreements
concerned.” 107

E. JUSTIFICATION OF NATIONAL MEASURES
The CJEU consistently refers to l’économie générale as a
justification of national measures in area of state aid. In contrast to
situations where the assessment is left to the national courts, in state
aid cases the CJEU scrutinizes the economy of a national rule itself. 108
102. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC).
103. See Case C-186/16, Ruxandra Paula Andriciuc v. Bana Romaneasca SA,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:703 (Sept. 20, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=194645&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=13088259.
104. Directive 93/13/EEC, supra note 102, at art. 1(2).
105. See Ruxandra Paula Andriciuc, ECLI:EU:C:2017:703, ¶ 26.
106. Id. ¶ 29.
107. See id. ¶ 30 (“In the present case, as the Advocate General observed in point
59 of his Opinion, it is for the referring court to assess, having regard to the nature,
the general scheme and the stipulations of the loan agreements concerned, as well as
the legal and factual context in which those matters are to be viewed, whether the
term in question, under which the loan must be repaid in the same currency as that
in which it was advanced, reflects statutory provisions of national law, within the
meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 93/13.”).
108. See, e.g.F 4@7) 46,'TB>'F -<!+9)*!5; I5@O!@<; .:8 1D 8%)<J!@ *)OO) N<59@5)F
Ufficio Genova 1 ECLI:EU:C:2005:774, ¶ 51 (Dec. 15, 2005),
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This line of practice can be traced back to 1974, when the Court found
that the Italian system, by relieving employers from payment of a part
of social charges aimed for family allowances was not justified by the
nature or general scheme, that is, by l’économie générale of the Italian
fiscal system. 109 That justification is echoed in the “Commission
Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating
to Direct Business Taxation” of 1978, 110 and in subsequent practice of
the Court. In order to be justified on this ground, a national measure
needs to result directly from the founding principles of the national
system of taxation. 111 Recently, the Court has further clarified that a
distinction needs to be made between inherent mechanisms of the
fiscal system that are necessary for achievement of its objectives, and
mechanisms that are external to it, only the former being accepted as
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=57088&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3016524 (“The tax reduction is
not justified by the nature and overall structure of the tax system in question. . . . It
is not an adaptation of the general scheme to the particular characteristics of banking
undertakings. It is apparent from the documents before the Court that it was put
forward expressly by the national authorities as a means of improving the
competitiveness of certain undertakings at a certain stage in the development of the
sector.”).
109. Case C-173/73, Italy v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:1974:71, ¶ 15(3) (July 2,
1974), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=88673&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3018370 (“It must be
concluded that the partial reduction of social charges pertaining to family allowances
devolving upon employers in the textile sector is a measure intended partially to
exempt undertakings of a particular industrial sector from the financial charges
arising from the normal application of the general social security system, without
there being any justification for this exemption on the basis of the nature or general
scheme of this system.”).
110. Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures
Relating to Direct Business Taxation (EC) 1998 O.J. (C 384), ¶¶ 1-3 (noting the
importance and desirability of compatible taxation systems across Member States in
the establishment of a common market).
111. Case C-88/03, Portugal v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2006:511, ¶ 81 (Sept. 6,
2006), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=&docid=66445&pageIndex=
0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=3024825 (“A measure
which creates an exception to the application of the general tax system may be
justified by the nature and overall structure of the tax system if the Member State
concerned can show that that measure results directly form the basic or guiding
principles of its tax system. In that connection, a distinction must be made between,
on the one hand, the objectives attributed to a particular tax scheme which are
extrinsic to it and, on the other, the mechanisms inherent in the tax system itself
which are necessary for the achievement of such objectives.”).
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a justification. 112

F. OTHER EXAMPLES OF L’ECONOMIE GENERALE
In another line of cases l’économie générale is invoked in order to
establish a relationship between a general rule and derogation. 113
The CJEU invoked l’économie générale to interpret the objective
of the framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant, which is,
according to the principle of mutual recognition, a replacement of the
multilateral system of extradition by a system of surrender based on
cooperation of national judicial authorities. 114
It is interesting to note that the CJEU only refers to l’économie
générale, in context of systemic change in the system of extradition,
in Piotrowski which is the most recent of the three cases discussed
here—Aranyosi and Kovalkovas being the other two. 115 At the same
112. Case C-374/17, Finanzamt B v. A-Brauerei, ECLI:EU:C:2018:102, ¶ 48
(Dec. 19, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
209352&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=30
24825.
113. Case C-560/16, E.0G 4J)+" L;O*!<% 8M 1D H!+"@)O 2#*;3+"F
ECLI:EU:C:2018:167, ¶ 26 (Mar. 7, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=200014&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=13089869; see Case C-367/16, Dawid Piotrowski,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:27, ¶ 47 (Jan. 23, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=198646&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=13090561.
114. See Dawid Piotrowski, ECLI:EU:C:2018:27, ¶ 46 (“As regards the context
and overall scheme of Article 3(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584, it should be
noted that, as is apparent in particular from Article 1(1) and (2) and recitals 5 and 7
thereof, the purpose of the framework decision is to replace the multilateral system
of extradition based on the European Convention on Extradition of 13 December
1957 with a system of surrender, as between judicial authorities, of convicted or
suspected persons for the purpose of enforcing judgments or of conducting
prosecutions, the system of surrender being based on the principle of mutual
recognition.”).
115. See id. ¶¶ 46-47 (noting the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal
matters is that member states are obliged to give effect to arrest warrants); see
generally Case C-404/15, Pál Aranyosi v. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:198 (Apr. 5, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=175547&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=7632447; Case C-477/16 PPU, Openbaar Ministerie v.
Ruslanas
Kovalkovas,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:861
(Nov.
10,
2016),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=185243&pageInd
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time, all three cases refer to the link between Article 1 and recitals 5
and 7 of the Framework Decision. 116 While this looks similar to
ordinary development of case law, that is in the Court’s parlance
development of jurisprudence constante, or in English, wellestablished case law, it invokes a different kind of authority. Namely,
the Court, by invoking l’économie générale, refers to “inherent”
characteristics of a rule, in this case inherent relationship between
recitals of the Framework Decision and its Article 1. 117 Once
established by the Court, this relationship is inherent and cannot be
changed by the evolution of case law. 118

V. MEANING AND FUNCTION OF L’ÉCONOMIE
GÉNÉRALE IN EU LAW
Even a quick look into the phenomenology of l’économie générale
in judicial reasoning of the CJEU shows a few regularities: (a), there
is a variation of reference to “l’économie générale” and to “l’économie
générale et la finalité,” suggesting presence of ontological and
teleological elements of the concept. 119 Also, reference to l’économie
générale sometimes presents as a single and independent
interpretative tool, and sometimes, as a validation of other legal
arguments or as corroboration of explicit legal authority, such as
ex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=7632895.
116. See Dawid Piotrowski, ECLI:EU:C:2018:27, ¶ 46; Pál Aranyosi,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:19, ¶ 75 (“[T]he purpose of the Framework Decision, as is
apparent in particular from Article 1(1) and (2) thereof and recitals 5 and 7 in the
preamble thereto, is to replace the multilateral system of extradition”); Ruslanas
Kovalkovas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861, ¶ 25 (“[I]t should be noted that, as is apparent
from Article 1(1) and (2) and recitals 5 and 7 thereof in particular, the purpose of the
Framework Decision is to replace the multilateral system of extradition.”).
117. Dawid Piotrowski, ECLI:EU:C:2018:27, ¶ 46; Pál Aranyosi,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:19, ¶ 75; Ruslanas Kovalkovas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861, ¶ 25.
118. Dawid Piotrowski, ECLI:EU:C:2018:27, ¶ 46; Pál Aranyosi,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:19, ¶ 75; Ruslanas Kovalkovas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861, ¶ 25.
119. See Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 888 (1997)
(recognizing ontological actualities transpired from classifications designed to
describe behavior results in a failure to notice effects of this transformation); see
also Koen Lenaerts, Interpretation and the Court of Justice: A Basis for
Comparative Reflection, 41 INT’L L. 1011, 1016 (2007) (noting the European Court
of Justice’s teleological interpretation method in order to understand the purpose of
a provision).
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legislation or jurisprudence constant, and (b), interpretation from
l’économie générale is justificatory and in function of choosing
among two or more sources of written authority. 120

A. ONTOLOGY AND TELEOLOGY OF L’ÉCONOMIE GÉNÉRALE
The concept of l’économie générale, as applied by the CJEU
comprises two dimensions: ontological (general scheme, German:
allgemeine Systematik) and teleological (purpose, German:
Zweck). 121
The ontological dimension expresses the idea of a grand scheme
within which a rule under interpretation operates. 122 That scheme can
be of constitutional nature, as we have seen in Van Gend en Loos, but
may also represent specific areas of EU law, such as competition,
consumer protection, or an area of freedom, security, and justice. 123
In any case, when invoking l’économie générale, the Court
inscribes the rule under interpretation into broader schemata of the
European legal order. In doing so, the Court constructs an impression
of objectivity and inevitability of a given interpretation. 124 Among
120. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, SCOPE OF REVIEW: GENERAL PRINCIPLES 2,
5, 7 (Oct. 10, 2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
adminlaw/eu/Treaties_JudRev_Ron_wdraft.authcheckdam.pdf (emphasizing the
Court of Justice takes a “creative approach” to legal interpretation and applies a
variety of “general principles of law” in the development of EU jurisprudence); see
also Lenaerts, supra note 119, at 1016 (explaining the three primary interpretation
methods used by the Court of Justice that focus on text, context, and purpose).
121. See generally Johannes Busse et al., Actually, What Does “Ontology”
Mean? A Term Coined by Philosophy in the Light of Different Scientific Disciplines,
J. COMPUTING & INFO. TECH. 29 (2015) (discussing the term “ontology” from the
perspective of various disciplines); see also Martin Bertman, Kant’s Theology and
Teleology, 3 RES COGITANS 47, 48 (2006) (“The fulcrum of theology is the principle
of God’s teleology – (telein in Greek connotes perfectly complete) – in the organ of
nature.”).
122. Schlag, supra note 119, at 898.
123. Damian Chalmers & Luis Barroso, What Van Gend en Loos Stands For, 12
INT’L J. CON. L. 105, 109, 122-23, 129 (Jan. 2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/
icon/mou003.
124. See Dr. Günter Wilms, Protecting Fundamental Values in the European
Union Through the Rule of Law, EUROPEAN UNIV. INST. 58, 67, 75 (2017),
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/44987/RSCAS_Ebook_Wilms_EU_Ru
leOfLaw_2017.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y (recognizing the role of the CJEU is
to ensure, in applying and interpreting the Articles of the TFEU, observation of the

2019] ORIGINALISM, PURPOSIVISM, AND L’ÉCONOMIE GÉNÉRALE

627

more possible interpretations, the one which is chosen and valid is the
one that best fits the grand scheme. In fact, it is the grand scheme that
validates the chosen interpretation. 125 Moreover, alternative
interpretations that may have been discussed in process of
adjudication are usually not even mentioned in a judgment, except
from time to time where they may be detected in an opinion of the
Advocate General. 126 This is not surprising, since the very concept of
l’économie générale rests on idea that the chosen interpretation is
based on a pre-existing and unalterable authority. In such
circumstances when l’économie générale is invoked, there is no
pressing need to refer to jurisprudence constante or any other
authority. Both the rule and the general scheme speak for themselves
through agency of the Court. While a reference to jurisprudence
constante generally entails a citation of relevant case law, reference to
l’économie générale does not, except where the interpretation
according to l’économie générale itself has become constante. 127
law).
125. Id. at 67. According to Article 19(1) TFEU, the CJEU ensures that in the
interpretation and application of the Treaties (TEU and TFEU) the law is observed.
The expression “the rule of law” is not expressly mentioned but the wording of
Article 19 TFEU is wide enough to cover it. The Treaties encompass both the values
under Article 2 TFEU and the control mechanism of Article 7 TEU.
126. See Case C-16/16P, Kingdom of Belgium v. European Commission, ¶ 49,
2018 E.C.R (“In order to maintain the uniform interpretation of EU law, in the case
of divergence between those versions, the provision in question must therefore be
interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it
forms part . . . .”); see generally Pál Aranyosi, ECLI:EU:C:2016:19; Ruslanas
Kovalkovas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861 (neither judgment makes mention of alternative
interpretations discussed).
127. See Case C-404/16, Lombard Ingatlan Lízing Zrt. v. Nemzeti Adó- és
Vámhivatal Fellebbviteli Igazgatóság, ECLI:EU:C:2017:759, ¶ 21 (Oct. 12, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=195433&pageInd
ex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13097059 (“À cet
égard, il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante de la Cour que les dispositions du
droit de l’Union doivent être interprétées et appliquées de manière uniforme, à la
lumière des versions établies dans toutes les langues de l’Union européenne. En cas
de disparité entre les diverses versions linguistiques d’un texte du droit de l’Union,
la disposition en cause doit être interprétée en fonction de l’économie générale et de
la finalité de la réglementation dont elle constitue un élément (arrêt du 17 mai 2017,
ERGO Poist’;1Q@F 4-48/16, EU:C:2017:377, point 37.”); see also Case C-367/16,
Dawid Piotrowski, ECLI:EU:C:2018:27, ¶ 40 (Jan. 23, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=198646&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=13090561.
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Similarly, the teleological dimension and the wording that the Court
uses sometimes explicitly includes the word finalité. 128 Again, the
purpose of a rule under interpretation is understood as being objective
and pre-determined. It is purported to be given by regulatory
authorities and not to be a creation of the Court. If there is a written
authority referred to, it is usually confined to recitals of a directive or
other secondary EU legislation. 129 Yet, the expression finalité appears
to refer to the authors’ objectives of the rule understood within the
grand scheme of l’économie générale. 130 In other words, such
objectives are to be pursued only and insofar as they correspond to that
grand scheme. One could imagine interpretation according to
l’économie générale behaving like a ballistic missile, in which its
target is carefully chosen and aimed at in advance, and once it is
launched, the task of the Court is only to plot and describe the predetermined trajectory.

B. WRITTEN AUTHORITY AND JUSTIFICATORY NATURE OF
L’ÉCONOMIE GÉNÉRALE
In legal systems based on civil law, courts are inclined to rely on
legislation as a dominant legal source. 131 Nevertheless, court-made
law is also relevant and the need to ensure uniform interpretation of
law is recognized. 132 Whereas, in common law systems, uniformity
and coherence of law are ensured by judicial precedent. Legal systems
based on or influenced by French law recourse to the doctrine of
128. See, e.g., Dawid Piotrowski, ECLI:EU:C:2018:27, ¶ 25.
129. See generally id. ¶¶ 3-9 (citing directly to primary authorities and regulatory
directives).
130. See, e.g., id. ¶ 25 (emphasizing that the Court of Appeals in Brussels
considerd it necessary to seek clarifications from the Court of Justice regarding the
scope and purpose of provisions under European Law to assure it is interpreted in
the manner consistent with the authors’ intention, or “afin d’assurer une
interprétation du droit belge conforme au texte et à la finalité de celle-ci”).
131. Key Features of Common Law or Civil Law Systems, WORLD BANK GRP.,
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/legislation-regulation/
framework-assessment/legal-systems/common-vs-civil-law (last visited Feb. 27,
2019).
132. Opinion No. 20 on the Role of Courts with Respect to Uniform Application
of the Law, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccje/the-role-of-courtswith-respect-to-uniform-application-of-the-law (last visited Mar. 27, 2019)
(highlighting the role of courts with respect to uniform application of the law).
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jurisprudence constante, and so does the CJEU.
Nowadays, both judicial precedent and jurisprudence constante
materialize in written form and contribute to the reduction of
complexity. 133 Such reduction is inherent to judicial work, during
which the initial multiple feasible outcomes dissolve to singular
solutions. When a court refers to written authority it does it for a
reason—to create an impression of stability and predictability that are
built around legal sources that constitute firm and documented
referential points. Regardless of whether such referents are legislative
or praetorian, they constitute the legal reality to which future legal
propositions relate and, in such a way, reduce complexity.
The difficulty with l’économie générale is that, while it is typically
presented as an objective picture of legal reality, it often lacks a direct
and easily discernible link to explicit legal authority. 134 In contrast,
reference to jurisprudence constante, by the very nature of the
concept, demonstrates a continuous chain of purportedly coherent
legal authority. 135 Accordingly, claims from jurisprudence constante
correspond to existing legal authority and are based on expectations
that jurisprudence constante will be followed; whereas claims from
l’économie générale are more akin to Laplacean extraordinary claims
that, in order to be validated, require extraordinary evidence. 136
133. See Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent:
A Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation,
65 LA. L. REV. 776, 779 (2005) (highlighting the “abstract” terms that comprise
civilian codes compared to the “specific” terms used in common law jurisdictions);
Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1187,
1187-88 (2007) (noting the evolution of written statutes and judicial opinions,
particularly the development of textual common law resulting from judges’
opinions).
134. See, e.g., Case C-30/14, Ryanair Ltd v. PR Aviation BV,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:10, ¶ 40 (Jan. 15, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=161388&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=13100635; Case C-138/79, SA Roquette Frères v. Council
Eur. Cmty., 1980 E.C.R. 3333, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf?text=
&docid=90473&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&
cid=12872666.
135. See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Judicial Precedent in Civil Law Systems:
A Dynamic Analysis, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 519, 522 (2006).
136. PIERRE-SIMON DE LAPLACE, THÉORIE ANALYTIQUE DES PROBABILITÉS xvi
(3d ed., Courcier 1820) (suggesting that the weight of evidence for an extraordinary
claim must be proportioned to its strangeness).
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Paradoxically, arguments from l’économie générale are often
employed exactly because such evidence is missing what makes their
validation contingent on imagination and faith.
Yet, the problem with imagination and faith is in what Pierre Schlag
calls “self-referential complexity,” 137 in which a situation where any
outcome of thinking is possible. In order to avoid that trap, l’économie
générale, is in a need of a plausible narrative, a plan devised by an
authority external to, and independent from, the interpreter itself.
Thus, when referring to l’économie générale courts seek to deliver
singular legal outcomes by justifying those that fit into a supposedly
pre-existing narrative and by dismissing the ones that do not.
At the outset of any interpretative effort there is a text, which is
equally valid for interpretation of literature, historical documents,
religious scripture, and legal rules. In fact, Judeo-Christian tradition,
rules, and social practices are based on a book, more specifically, on
certain pre-existing authority that is documented in written form and
subject to subsequent interpretation. 138 But how did we arrive from
initial certainty of a text to the interpretative abundance creating the
need to reduce complexity? 139 Obviously, if text had a single and
137. Schlag, supra note 119, at 889 (“It is precisely because the fundamental
ontological entities were imaginary that all manner of complex relations could be
established among them. Because the units of analysis lacked any robust or
stabilized referent, virtually anything could be said about how they were related to
each other.”).
138. See Dr. Richard Lee, Seven Principles of the Judeo-Christian Ethic, SERMON
CENTRAL,
https://www.sermoncentral.com/content/Richard-Lee-7-PrinciplesJudeo-Christian-Ethic?ac=true&csplit=9060 (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
139. See generally WOLFGANG WILDGEN, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN
LANGUAGE: SCENARIOS, PRINCIPLES, AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS 90 (2004)
(describing the expansion of the written word and the increased need for
interpretation); Zechariah 5:1-4 (New Kings James); Frederic William Maitland,
Outlines of English Legal History, 560—1600, in 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 203-05, 230 (Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher eds.,
Liberty Fund, Inc. 2011) (1911) (summarizing the formation of the Roman Twelve
Tables); Dirkie Smit, Reading the Bible Through the Ages? Historical and
Hermeneutical Perspectives 1 STELLENBOSCH THEOLOGICAL J. 175, 175-76 (2015)
(recounting the history of Biblical reception and interpretation); Write873,
Hammurabi’s Code: Babylonian Law Set in Stone, ANCIENT HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA
(Oct. 4, 2011), https://www.ancient.eu/article/68/hammurabis-code-babylonianlaw-set-in-stone/ (noting the strict and absolute nature of laws such as Hammurabi’s
code).
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definitive meaning, interpretation would not be necessary. The same
holds if we could determine, with confidence, which text governs the
case at hand. In either case, l’économie générale helps. It both
provides guidance as to what the text may mean and which text,
exactly, is applicable. In order to make sense, interpretation has to fit
within a broader narrative. L’économie générale is such a narrative
that provides a meaning to a sequence of independent but interconnected interpretative events. It provides for a context within which
relevant interpretative events make sense. This said, it is not entirely
unexpected that origins of l’économie générale can be found in the
Bible.
According to the Gospel of Matthew, after forty days in a desert
Jesus is approached by Satan and challenged by what is commonly
known as the temptations of Christ. 140 In the first temptation, Satan
says: “If you are the Son of God tell these stones to become bread”
(Matthew 4:3). 141 Jesus replies by reference to Deuteronomy: “It is
written: ‘Man shall not live on bread alone but on every word that
comes from the mouth of God’” (Matthew 4:4). 142 Jesus responds to
the temptation not by appealing directly to the power of God, but
instead, by referring to written authority, and apparently, to the
reference of him being identified as a Son of God on occasion of his
baptism. 143 Similar reference to Psalms continues in the second
temptation, where Satan himself refers to written authority with Psalm
91:11-12 in mind: “For it is written, ‘He will command his angels
concerning you and they will lift you up in their hands so that you will
not strike your foot against a stone’” (Matthew 4:6). 144 And in the third
temptation Jesus replies: “Away from me Satan! For it is written:
worship the Lord your God and serve him only” (Matthew 4:10). 145
Here we are dealing not only with an archetype of legal argument
that invokes and relies on written authority, but also with the structure
within which legal argumentation takes place. There are three
perfectly articulated constituents, namely the tempter (Satan), the
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Matthew 4:1-2 (New King James).
Matthew 4:3 (New King James).
Matthew 4:4 (New King James); Deuteronomy 8:3 (New King James).
Matthew 3:17 (New King James).
Matthew 4:6 (New King James); Psalm 91:11–12 (New King James).
Matthew 4:10 (New King James).
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tempted (Jesus), and the authority (what is written). Also, we are
presented with the resolution of the conflict, a judgment that leaves no
doubt that Jesus has won the case and that it is his reading of the
authority, and not Satan’s, that is the valid one.
But how do we know where the authority of text stops and where
context and purpose start to play role? How do we know, without
connecting the dots backwards, that it is Jesus, and not Satan, who
should win the dispute? How is the authority referred to by Jesus better
than authority referred to by Satan, knowing that both refer to the
presumably equally authoritative text of Psalms? In other words,
which Psalm is applicable to the case at hand? Apparently, Jesus wins
because the entire dialogue takes place within a broader and prearranged scheme, a narrative according to which the life and death of
Christ is instrumental to the fulfillment of the God’s plan, and
accordingly, written authority is validated only insofar as it fits into
that plan which, itself, remains tacit. In absence of that plan, known as
the economy of salvation, 146 it would not be possible to explain which
reference to written authority should prevail.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The notion of l’économie générale is a well-established legal
concept and a tool for legal interpretation. It is rooted in European
tradition and it imports at least some meaning from analogous ancient
Greek and Roman Catholic concepts.
First, the idea of the grand scheme is present in all of its iterations:
in the Greek tradition it is order (taxis), a choice (diairesis), and an
analysis (exergasia); 147 in Catholic tradition it is a Divine Plan, which
is being accomplished through the Church; 148 and in EU law it is the
master scheme of European integration that is maybe best illustrated
by Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950. 149
146. See J. Patout Burns, The Economy of Salvation: Two Patristic Traditions, 37
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 598, 600 (1976).
147. Robert S. Reid, “Neither Oratory nor Dialogue”: Dionysius of
Halicarnassus and the Genre of Plato’s “Apology,” 27 RHETORIC SOC’Y Q. 63, 69
(1997).
148. See discussion supra Section V.B.
UNION,
149. The
Schuman
Declaration—9
May
1950,
EUR.
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-
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Second, the idea of l’économie générale seems to be inherently nonpolitical. This does not mean that its narrative may not refer to political
issues, but rather that it is not concerned with or involved in political
process. According to Agamben, “the idea of an oikonomia, conceived
as an immanent ordering—domestic and not political in a strict
sense—of both divine and human life” 150 Thus, l’économie générale
does not entail deference to current political power, but invocation of
the grand scheme devised by a pre-existing ultimate authority, which
is what makes it constitutional in nature. Indeed, the idea of the EU
was not political at first, but there was a grand plan, for example, an
immanent ordering, according to which European integration was to
unfold. In fact, l’économie générale excludes deference to, and
imposes itself on, the political branch for all the elements of the
“proper” interpretation are given in advance and only need to be
discovered in process of interpretation. 151
Third, in all its iterations, l’économie générale is in the need of an
οἰκονόμος, a superintendent: the head of a household. In other words,
the existence and pursuance of l’économie générale is possible only
through some institutional agency, such as the Church or the
judiciary. 152 That agency presents itself as an utterer of the pre-existing
order and as a vigil that acts based on a bond of trust, indeed as a
nominated administrator. Finally, there is an element of faith that
binds together the agent and the narrative of l’économie générale, a
collective cognitive imperative that is, “a culturally agreed-on
expectancy or prescription which defines the particular form of a
phenomenon and the roles to be acted out within that form.” 153
Fourth, written word, is an inherent element of the l’économie
générale. Namely, as economy is based on authority and its pursuance
declaration_en (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
150. AGAMBEN, supra note 26, at 1 (emphasis added).
151. Arguments from l’économie générale are different from arguments from
legislative history in sense that the latter belong to the political process, while the
former are thought to be inherent into the rule as a part of a more general order.
152. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 146, at 607 (“Because the Church is the sole
mediator of the grace of Christ to humans during their earthly life, it is a constitutive
element in this limited functioning of the economy of salvation.”).
153. JULIAN JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAK-DOWN OF
THE BICAMERAL MIND 324 (First Manner Books 2000) (1976).
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entrusted to an oikonomos, that authority needs to be available in some
generally accessible form – a covenant, (Hebrew b’rit, ?/EK) pact, or
treaty between men and God, which originally involved animal
sacrifice, letting of blood as a constituent of an agreement. 154 Such a
covenant, as a medium for communication of authority would
typically stabilize in written form, although it can also be transferred
verbally through rituals or other behavioral forms. 155 Today, such a
pact takes form of a constitution or, as the case is in the EU, the
Founding Treaties.
In brief, l’économie générale appears to be a juridical iteration of a
more general idea, the elements of which comprise:
•
•
•
•

An external and independent authority, usually accessible in a
written form;
A grand scheme or plan devised by that authority;
An agent acting as a steward in pursuance of that plan; and
Individuals sharing the collective cognitive imperative that makes
them participants to it.

These elements are constitutive of the EU, which was conceived by
its founding fathers who devised a plan for European integration
constructed around economic freedoms, solidarity, and individual
rights. It was codified by the Founding Treaties, the plan stewarded by
European institutions, including the CJEU, which individuals believe
in or at least consent to. 156

154. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, COVENANT & POLITY IN BIBLICAL ISRAEL: BIBLICAL
FOUNDATIONS & JEWISH EXPRESSIONS 30 (Routledge 2017) (1995) (“[A]n
agreement in which a higher moral force, traditionally God, is either a direct party
to, or guarantor of the particular relationship.”).
155. See Michael J. Gorman, The Bible: A Book, a Library, a Story, an Invitation,
in SCRIPTURE AND ITS INTERPRETATION 3, 11 (Michael J. Gorman ed., 2017) (noting
that the covenant significantly contributed to the spread of written and verbal
authoritative scripture in the Jewish and Christian faiths).
156. See generally The EU in Brief, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/europeanunion/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en (last visited Mar. 29, 2019) (summarizing the goals
and values of the European Union); Historical Development of European
Integration: The First Treaties, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
factsheets/en/sheet/1/the-first-treaties (last visited Jan. 24, 2019) (providing an
overview of the historical development of European integration).
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For everyone in the business of applying law, interpretation
according to l’économie générale can prove to be a practical tool for
maintaining normative coherence and argumentative power of law,
both on the constitutional and sectorial level. Moreover, in the EU,
l’économie générale serves as a normative and argumentative support
of European liberal ontology and the grand scheme of European
solidarity that is stewarded by the European institutions. In other
words, it provides the underlying narrative within which interpretative
events make sense.
Those aware that law is not objective, but context sensitive and
subject to interpretation, a fact that is also recognized by the French
Code Civil, 157 might conclude that it is the Court and the judges that
determine the meaning of law. Further concluding that the judges seek
coherence by means of interpretation need to justify their decisions in
order to ensure legitimacy of adjudication, and ultimately, to that end,
construct interpretative narratives and develop tools for their
perpetuation, such as l’économie générale.

157. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1191 (Fr.) (“Lorsqu’une clause est
susceptible de deux sens, celui qui lui confère un effet l’emporte sur celui qui ne lui
en fait produire aucun.”).

